Abstract Transmission faults allow us to reason about permanent and transient value faults in a uniform way. However, all existing solutions to consensus in this model are either in the synchronous system, or require strong conditions for termination, that exclude the case where all messages of a process can be corrupted. In this paper we introduce eventual consistency in order to overcome this limitation. Eventual consistency denotes the existence of rounds in which processes receive the same set of messages. We show how eventually consistent rounds can be simulated from eventually synchronous rounds, and how eventually consistent rounds can be used to solve consensus. Depending on the nature and number of permanent and transient transmission faults, we obtain different conditions on n, the number of processes, in order to solve consensus in our weak model.
group membership, etc. The problem is defined over a set of processes Π , where each process p ∈ Π has an initial value v i , and requires that all processes agree on a common value.
Classical approach: Component fault model. Most research on consensus algorithms is considering component fault models, where faults are attached to a component that is either a process or a link. With respect to process/link faults, consensus can be considered with different fault assumptions. On the one end of the spectrum, processes/links can commit so called benign faults (processes fail only by crashing and links only loose messages); on the other end, faulty processes/links can exhibit an arbitrary behavior. Furthermore, in the context of a component fault model, faults are mainly permanent (as opposed to transient faults): if a process or link commits a fault, the process/link is considered to be faulty during whole execution. It follows that not all components can be faulty (at most f out of n per run), which is referred to as static faults (as opposed to dynamic faults that can affect any component).
Most research on consensus is about tolerating permanent and static process and/or link faults. While processes and links can be considered faulty, most of the literature considers only process faults. In the context of Byzantine faults, where at most f processes can behave arbitrarily, we can cite the early work of Lamport, Shostak and Pease [17, 22] for a synchronous system. Consensus in a partially synchronous system with Byzantine faults is considered in [2, 12, 21, 25] . Byzantine variants of Paxos [18] include [1, 10, 15, 19, 20] . Only few authors solve consensus in the synchronous system model where, in addition to Byzantine processes, a small number of links connecting correct processes may be arbitrary faulty during the entire execution of a consensus algorithm [24, 28, 30] . However, only a very limited number of links can be faulty.
There are two major problems of a priori blaming some component for the failure [11, 26, 27] . First, it may lead to undesirable consequences if faults are permanent: for example, in the classical Byzantine fault model, where a bounded number of processes can behave arbitrarily (even maliciously), the entire system will be considered faulty even if only one message from each process is received corrupted. Second, when solving consensus, faulty processes are typically not obliged to make a decision or they are allowed to decide differently than correct processes.
Some work in the component fault model has addressed transient and dynamic faults [5] . These papers solve consensus in the hybrid fault model for synchronous systems, where every process is allowed to commit up to f sa l arbitrary send link failures and experience up to f ra l arbitrary receive link failures without being considered as arbitrary faulty. Tolerating additional f s send and f r receive omissions (i.e., message loss) requires to increase the number of processes by small multiples of f s and f r .
Finally, note that when a process q receives a corrupted message from p, it makes no difference for q whether p is faulty and therefore sends a message that was not consistent with the protocol, or the message is corrupted by the link between p and q. Actually, for q these two cases are indistinguishable. Nevertheless, these two cases are not equivalent in the component fault model.
Alternative approach: Transmission fault model. These observations led to the definition of the transmission fault model that captures faults without blaming a specific component for the fault [26] . The transmission fault model is well-adapted to dynamic and transient faults.
Consensus under transmission faults in a synchronous system has been considered initially in [26] . In [11] , this work combined with ideas from [14] , is extended to nonsynchronous systems with only benign transmission faults, leading to the Heard-Of Model (HO model). The paper gives several consensus algorithms under benign transmission faults.
In [4] , the HO model for benign faults is extended to value faults. There, consensus under transmission faults (both benign and value faults) is solved the first time in a nonsynchronous setting.
For safety, only the number of corrupted messages is restricted, that is, in each round r of the round based model, every process p receives at most α corrupted messages. 1 However, for liveness, some additional assumptions are necessary, namely rounds in which some subset of processes does not receive any corrupted messages. 2 This means that, despite the possibility to handle dynamic and transient value faults in a non-synchronous system, [4] cannot tolerate permanent faults located at a process p, where all messages from p might be (always) corrupted.
This raises the following question: is it possible to design a consensus algorithm in the general transmission fault model, with non-synchronous assumptions, that does not require such a strong condition for liveness?
Transmission faults: Our contribution. We give a positive answer to the above question by presenting three consensus algorithms for transmission faults (both benign and value faults) that do not exclude permanent faults. 3 The key insight in achieving this goal is the introduction of the notion of eventual consistency that turns out to be fundamental building block for solving consensus under transmission faults. Informally speaking, for round-based algorithms, eventual consistency denotes the existence of rounds in which processes receive the same set of messages.
Our three algorithms are inspired by well-known consensus algorithms [10, 12, 20] for the classical Byzantine fault model [17] , which we have adapted to the transmission fault model. All three algorithms require a round in which consistency eventually holds (processes receive the same set of messages). This round is used to bring the system in the univalent configuration, and later rounds are used to "detect" that the system entered a univalent configuration and allows processes to decide. So the key is to achieve eventually consistent rounds. This is the most important contribution. We show that eventually consistent rounds can be simulated from eventually synchronous rounds in the presence of both static and dynamic value faults. The benefits of our approach are the following: -First, contrary to most of the related work on transmission faults and on the hybrid fault model (where both processes and links can be arbitrary faulty), which considers the synchronous system model, our consensus algorithms can also be used in systems, where synchrony assumptions hold only eventually. -Second, contrary to the algorithms in [4] , our algorithms can also be used in systems with permanent faults located at a process p, where all messages from p might be (always) corrupted. -Third, by considering the transmission fault model, the algorithms can tolerate dynamic and transient value faults in addition to only permanent and static faults of the component fault model. As we explain in Sect. 10, considering (only) transmission faults allows a variety of interpretations, making it possible to apply our algorithms to a vari-ety of system models: partially synchronous system with Byzantine processes, partially synchronous system with Byzantine processes eventually restricted to "symmetrical faults" [29] , partially synchronous system with Byzantine processes, where, before stabilization time, in every round processes can receive some (bounded) number of corrupted messages from correct processes, etc.
Remark. Note that despite the similarity in title, [3] addresses a different topic. The paper investigates the possibility of designing protocols that are both self-stabilizing and faulttolerant in an asynchronous system. A self-stabilizing distributed algorithm is an algorithm that, when started in an arbitrary state, guarantees to converge to a legitimate state and then forever remains in a legitimate state. Solving oneshot consensus, which is the subject of our paper, is impossible in the context of self-stabilization, because a process can start in any state, i.e., its first step can be decide(v), where v is an arbitrary value.
In the model considered in our paper, (transmission) faults do not corrupt the initial configuration (the system starts in a pre-defined state) but may disturb the execution of the protocol. Therefore, the protocols presented in this paper cannot deal with an arbitrary initial configuration.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the transmission fault model we consider in Sect. 2. The consensus problem is defined in Sect. 3. In Sects. 4 and 5 we introduce the communication predicates that we consider in the paper, including eventual consistency. Section 6 shows how to simulate eventual consistency under weak communication predicates, while Sect. 7 shows how to solve consensus with eventual consistency. In Sect. 8 we discuss in detail the combination of one of the consensus algorithms and the eventual consistency simulation. As we show in Sect. 9, eventual consistency can be achieved also directly with authentication. In Sect. 10 we argue that Byzantine faults and permanent value faults located at a process are indistinguishable, and thus our algorithms also work (but not only) in a partial synchronous model with Byzantine processes. We conclude the paper in Sect. 11.
Model
We use a slightly extended version of the round-based model of [4] . In this model, we reason about faults only as transmission faults, without looking for a "culprit" for the fault [4] . Therefore there are no "faulty" processes and no state corruption in our model, but messages can be arbitrarily corrupted (or lost) before reception. Nevertheless, as we explain in Sect. 10, the model can be used to reason about classical Byzantine faults.
Computations in this model are structured in rounds, which are communication-closed layers in the sense that any message sent in a round can be received only in that round. As messages can be lost, this does not imply that the systems is synchronous. An algorithm A is specified by sending function S r p and transition function T r p for each round r and process p. We now give a formal definition of the roundbased model considered, and introduce the notions of (i) the heard-of set HO( p, r ), which captures synchrony and benign faults, (ii) the safe heard-of set SHO( p, r ), which handles corruptions, i.e., captures communication safety properties, and (iii) consistency CONS(r ), which is true in round r , if all processes receive the same set of messages at round r .
Heard-of sets and consistent rounds
Let Π be a finite non-empty set of cardinality n, and let M be a set of messages (optionally including a null placeholder indicating the empty message). 1. applies S r p to the current state and sends the message returned to each process, 4 2. determines the partial vector µ r p , formed by the messages that p receives at round r , and 3. applies T r p to its current state and µ r p .
The partial vector µ r p is called the reception vector of p at round r .
Computation evolves in an infinite sequence of rounds. For each process p and each round r , we introduce two subsets of Π . The first subset is the heard-of set, denoted HO( p, r ), which is the support of µ r p , i.e.,
A process q is in the set HO( p, r ) if p receives a message from process p in round r . Note that the message received may be corrupted. The second subset is the safe heard-of set, denoted SHO( p, r ), and defined by
where s q is q's state at the beginning of round r . A process q is in the set SHO ( p, r ) if the message received by p is not corrupted. In addition, for each round r , we define the consistency flag, denoted CONS (r ), which is true if all processes receive the same set of messages in round r , i.e.,
From the sets HO( p, r ) and SHO( p, r ), we form the altered heard-of set denoted AHO( p, r ) as follows:
For any round r , and for any set of rounds Φ, we further define the safe kernel of r resp. Φ:
SK(r )
The safe kernel consists of all processes whose messages were received correctly by all processes. We use also SK = SK (N). Similarly, the altered span (of round r ) denotes the set of processes from which at least one process received a corrupted message (at round r ):
AS (r )
We also extend the notion of CONS in a natural way to a set Φ of rounds, i.e., CONS (Φ) = r ∈Φ CONS (r ).
HO machines
A heard-of machine for a set of processes Π is a pair (A, P), where A is an algorithm on Π , and P is a communication predicate, i.e., a predicate over the collection
A run of an HO machine M is entirely determined by the initial configuration (i.e., the collection of process initial states), and the collection of the reception vectors µ r p p∈Π, r >0 .
Simulation of communication predicates
In the paper we will need to simulate 5 communication predicates P using some HO machine M = (A, P). Intuitively, in such a simulation, several rounds of M will be used to simulate one round in which predicate P holds. If the run of M consists of k rounds, then algorithm A is a k round simulation of P from P. 5 The notion of a simulation differs from the notion of a translation of the HO model for benign faults. A translation establishes a relation purely based on connectivity, while with value faults, also some computation is involved. Because of this, we decided thus to use the term simulation instead.
Formally, let k be any positive integer, and let A be an algorithm that maintains a variable m p ∈M and Msg p ∈ M n at every process p. We call macro-round ρ the sequence of the k consecutive round k(ρ − 1) + 1, . . . , kρ. The variable m p is an input variable that can be set externally in every macro-round. 6 The value of m p at the beginning of macro-round ρ is denoted m (ρ) p , and the value of Msg p at the end of macro-round ρ is denoted Msg (ρ) p . For the macroround ρ, we define in analogy to the definitions of Sect. 2.1:
We say that the HO machine M = (A, P) simulates the communication predicate P in k rounds if for any run of M,
Given a simulation A of P from P, any problem that can be solved with P by algorithm A can be solved with P instead by simply simulating rounds of the algorithm A using algorithm A. In such a composed algorithm, the input variable m (ρ) p of algorithm A is set at each macro-round ρ to the value returned by the sending function of A , and the transition function of A is applied to the output Msg 
Consensus
Let V be (non-empty) totally ordered set. In the consensus problem every process p has an initial value init p ∈ V and decides irrevocably on a decision value, fulfilling:
Integrity:
If all processes have the same initial value this is the only possible decision value. Agreement: No two processes may decide differently. Termination: All processes eventually decide.
Since, contrary to classical approaches, there is no deviation according to T r p , and thus we do not have the notion of a faulty process, the upper specification makes no exemption: all processes must decide the initial value in the Integrity clause, and all processes must make a decision by the Termination clause.
Formally, an HO machine (A, P) solves consensus, if any run for which P holds, satisfies Integrity, Agreement, and Termination. To make this definition non-trivial, we assume that the set of HO and SHO collections for which P holds is non-empty.
Communication predicates
In this section we introduce the communication predicates that will be used in the paper. As already mentioned, we reason about faults only as transmission faults. This allows us to deal with both permanent and transient faults, but also with static and dynamic faults.
Predicates that capture static and dynamic value faults
A dynamic fault is a fault that can affect any link in the system-as opposed to static faults that affect the links of at most f out of n processes per run [4] . We start with static faults:
with f ∈ N and N = {0, . . . , n}. P stat is the name of the predicate, and f is a free parameter. P f stat is a safety predicate that models static faults, where corrupted messages are received only from a set of f processes. In Sect. 10 we will argue that such an assumption corresponds to a system with at most f Byzantine processes.
For our algorithms we will also consider the weaker safety predicate P f dyn (∀ f ∈ N , P f stat implies P f dyn ) that restricts the number of corrupted messages only per round and per process:
with f ∈ N and 0 ≤ f ≤ n. Predicate P f dyn potentially allows corrupted messages on all links in a run, it therefore models dynamic value faults.
Predicates that restrict asynchrony of communication and dynamism of faults
Predicates P stat and P dyn only restrict the number of value faults; however, it does not tell us anything about liveness of communication. From [13] we know that we cannot solve consensus in an asynchronous system if all messages sent by one process may be lost. On the other hand, Santoro and Widmayer [26] showed that consensus is impossible to solve in a synchronous system if, at each time unit, there is one process whose messages may be lost. Therefore, in order to solve consensus we need to restrict asynchrony of communication and dynamism of faults.
A synchronous system could be modeled as follows:
requires that there is a set of processes (safe kernel) of size n − f whose messages are correctly received in every round. From
it follows that P f SK implies static faults only. However, we want to study consensus with dynamic faults. We consider therefore the following predicate:
with f ∈ N and k > 0. This predicate (repeatedly) requires a safe kernel of size n − f only eventually and only for k rounds. It also restrict the dynamism of value faults during these k round; i.e., corrupted messages can only be received from at most f processes.
In the paper we will consider P SK always in conjunction, either with P stat or P dyn . When we assume P SK with 
The implementation of the predicate P SK in a partially synchronous system (in conjunction, either with P stat or P dyn ) is not discussed in this paper. The reader is referred to [8, 12] .
Permanent versus transient faults
Both predicates, P stat ∧ P SK and P dyn ∧ P SK allow permanent faults. Consider for example a run and a process p, where every process receives a corrupted message from p in every round:
and all other messages are received correctly. Such a run is included in the set of runs given by P stat ∧ P SK and P dyn ∧ P SK , and thus the algorithms given later in the paper can solve consensus in such a run. More precisely, P f stat ∧ P f SK and P f dyn ∧ P f SK permits the existence of up to f such processes. As pointed out in Sect. 10, this allows our algorithms to solve consensus also, e.g., in classical models with Byzantine faults, an addresses the question raised in the introduction. Indeed, this contrasts with [4] , where, although also P dyn is considered (named P α there), eventually there has to be a round, where a sufficiently large subset of processes do not receive any corrupted messages. There, (most) faults have to be transient.
Eventual consistency
In this section we introduce the notion of eventual consistency that turns out to be a fundamental building block for solving consensus under transmission value faults. Eventual consistency abstracts the major complexity present when solving consensus under the weak communication predicates presented above. Therefore eventual consistency allows us to express consensus algorithms in a very concise and elegant way.
Informally speaking, eventual consistency combines the requirement of a consistent round (CONS (r ) in our model) with some requirements on liveness and safety of communication. It can be seen as an eventual version of interactive consistency [22] . In a component fault model, an algorithm that solves interactive consistency allows correct processes to agree on a vector, where at least n − f entries correspond to the initial values of the corresponding correct processes ( f is the maximum number of faulty processes).
Interactive consistency, when seen as a communication primitive, can be captured by the following predicate:
When we express the result of [22] in our model, their algorithm allows a f + 1 round simulation of P
Instead of P I C , we introduce a weaker predicate. We call the predicate eventual consistency and define it as follows:
This predicate requires that there is always eventually a consistent round with a safe kernel of size n − f . In contrast to P f SK and P I C , this predicate requires these safe kernels only eventually and then only for a single round. Also faults are no more static: P f cons alone does not imply P f stat for any f < n. Note that P f cons is a stronger predicate than P f,1 SK : although both predicates require a safe kernel of size n − f and both restrict the dynamism of value faults for a single round, P f cons in addition requires that consistency holds during this round, i.e., for any two processes p and q we have µ p = µ q .
However, P cons can be simulated from P SK . In the next section, we give two such simulations, and then establish the link to solving consensus. [10] . It ensures consistency during a sequence of rounds where the size of the kernel is at least n − f (the corrupted messages can be received only from at most f processes). Moreover, it preserves P f stat , i.e., if P f stat holds for basic rounds, then P f stat holds also for the macrorounds obtained by the 3-round simulation using Algorithm 1. It requires n > 3 f . As already mentioned in Sect. 2.3, a simulation is an algorithm that maintains at each process p two variables: an input variable m p that is set at the beginning of every macro-round ρ (line 7), and an output variable Msg p whose value is considered at the end of every macroround ρ (lines 24 and 26). The special value ⊥ represents the case when a (reception) vector does not contain a message from the respective process.
Algorithm 1 is a coordinator-based algorithm, where the coordinator is chosen using a rotating coordinator strategy: the coordinator of macro-round ρ is process ρmodn + 1; in Algorithm 1 the variable coord refers to this process. We describe Algorithm 1 from the point of view of the message v 2 that is sent by process p 2 using Fig. 1 . Assume that process p 1 is the coordinator. In round 3ρ − 2, process p 2 sends the message v 2 to all. In rounds 3ρ − 1 and 3ρ of Algorithm 1, the processes send messages that contain a vector of those messages received in round 3ρ − 2. In this description we focus only on those elements of the vectors that are related to message v 2 that is sent by process p 2 in macro-round ρ. In round 3ρ − 1, all processes send the value received from p 2 to all. 7 The coordinator then compares the value received from p 2 , say v 2 , in round 3ρ − 2 with the value indirectly received from the other processes.
If at least 2 f + 1 values v 2 have been received by the coordinator p 1 , then p 1 keeps v 2 as the message received from p 2 . Otherwise p 1 sets the message received from p 2 send received p to all 13: T r p :
14:
if p = coord then 15: for all q ∈ Π do 16 : for all q ∈ Π do 23 :
else 26 : Algorithm 1 relies on a coordinator for ensuring P f cons : all processes assign to Msg p the value received from the coordinator in round 3ρ (see line 24) . This is achieved during a macro-round in which the size of the safe kernel is at least n − f , with the coordinator in the safe kernel. The rotating coordinator strategy ensures the existence of such a macro-round. Consider Fig. 2 that illustrates the mechanism for ensuring consistency from the point of view of the message sent by process p 4 and received by process p 3 . The coordinator adopts value v 1 as the message sent by process p 4 in round 3ρ − 1 (line 16) since it is forwarded by 2 f + 1 processes. This ensures that the value v 1 sent by the coordinator in round 3ρ is also sent by at least f more processes from the safe kernel in round 3ρ. Therefore, the value sent by the coordinator satisfies the condition of line 23 at all processes and is therefore assigned to Msg p [ p 4 ] by all processes at line 24.
Using Fig. 3 , we now explain how Algorithm 1 preserves P f stat . Figure 3 considers message v 2 sent by p 2 and received by p 3 ; again, process p 1 is the coordinator. Messages received from p 2 in round 3ρ −2 are not corrupted, and we show that the message received by p 3 from p 2 in macro- round ρ can only be v 2 or ⊥. In round 3ρ, process p 3 does not "blindly" adopt the value received from the coordinator (the message received can be corrupted). The value received in round 3ρ from the coordinator is adopted by p 3 only if the same value is received from at least f additional processes (line 23). This ensures that at least one such message is not corrupted. In Fig. 3 , process p 3 adopts ⊥ as message received from p 2 in macro-round ρ, since it did not received f + 1 messages equal to value v 2 received from the coordinator.
Proof To avoid ambiguities, let in this proof AS ρ = ρ>0 AS(ρ) denote the altered span with respect to macro-rounds implemented by Algorithm 1, while AS = r >0 AS(r ) denotes the altered span with respect to the rounds of Algorithm 1.
We need to show that |AS ρ | ≤ f given that |AS| ≤ f . It is thus sufficient to show AS ρ ⊆ AS. Assume by contradiction that there is a process p ∈ Π , a process s ∈ AS, and a macro-round ρ so that s ∈ AHO( p, ρ), i.e., s sends message m in macro-round ρ and p receives m = m.
Then, because of line 23, for Q = {q :
Proof Let ρ denote a macro-round, let Φ = 3ρ − 2, 3ρ − 1, 3ρ be the set of rounds of ρ, and let c 0 = ρmodn + 1 be the coordinator of ρ such that
holds and (ii) the coordinator is chosen using a rotating coordinator scheme (the coordinator of macro-round ρ is process ρmodn + 1).
We show that with Algorithm 1 (i) CONS(ρ) and (ii)
(i) Assume by contradiction that for two processes p and q, Msg
. By round 3ρ, every process adopts the value of c 0 or sets
represent the set of processes from which p receives v at position s in round r. Similarly, for rounds r ∈ [3ρ − 1, 3ρ], let s) . This contradicts the assumption that the condition in line 23 is false for process q.
(ii) For every process p ∈ Π and q ∈ SK(Φ), by definition we have received p [q] = m q at the end of round 3ρ − 2. In round 3ρ − 1, c 0 receives received q [q] = m q from every process q ∈ SK(Φ), and thus there is no q ∈ SK(Φ) s.t. c 0 sets received c 0 [q] to ⊥ (*). In round 3ρ, since c 0 ∈ SK (Φ), every process p receives the message from c 0 . In addition, since n > 3 f and |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f , every process receives the message from n − f > f + 1 processes in SK(Φ). By (*) and line 23, for all processes p and all q ∈ SK(Φ), we have
Remark 1 Algorithm 1 can easily be extended to preserve also the following predicate:
Intuitively, such an assumption is typical for algorithms that are designed to work in a system with reliable channels. The modified simulation algorithm then uses the reception vector of the first round as Msg in case there would be less than f elements in Msg. It is easy to show that this does not affect Corollary 1, while preserving the above predicate. Since our algorithms do not need this assumption, we do not detail this extension further.
Remark 2 Interestingly there is also decentralized (i.e., coordinator-free) solution to this simulation. The algorithm is presented in [7] in terms of Byzantine faults but can be easily adapted to our framework. Such a simulation requires f + 1 rounds. In some cases this approach can be beneficial [6] .
Simulation in the presence of dynamic value faults
In this section we show a simulation of P cons from P SK and the weaker predicate P dyn that (partially) preserves P dyn .
More precisely, we show a simulation from P for all q ∈ Π do 15 : for all q ∈ Π do 23 : for all q ∈ Π do 30 :
else 33: The simulation requires four rounds, as shown by Algorithm 2. As we can see, β is not a parameter of the algorithm. Fixing β leads to some requirement on n. More
The communication pattern of Algorithm 2 is very similar to Algorithm 1 with the addition of one "all-to-all" round (see Fig. 4 , to be compared with Fig. 1 ). We explain Algorithm 2 from the point of view of the message sent by process p 2 . In round 4ρ − 3, process p 2 sends message v 2 to all. 8 In round 4ρ − 2, all processes send to all the value received from p 2 , and then compare the value v 2 received from p 2 in Algorithm 2 relies on a coordinator for ensuring P f cons : all processes assign to Msg p the value received from the coordinator in round 4ρ (see line 31). This is achieved during a macro-round in which the size of the safe kernel is at least n − f , with the coordinator in the safe kernel. Since consistency is ensured under the same conditions as with Algorithm 1, we use exactly the same mechanism in Algorithm 2.
The additional complexity of Algorithm 2 comes from the part responsible for ensuring P β dyn . We start by explaining on Fig. 5 why Algorithm 1 does not preserve P α dyn for the simplest case f = α = 1, n = 4. According to P 1 dyn , every The problem comes from the fact that dynamic faults have a cumulative effect, i.e., messages that are corrupted in round 3ρ − 2 add to corrupted messages from round 3ρ.
We now explain why the addition of round 4ρ − 2 allows us to cope with this issue. Informally speaking, the role of round 4ρ − 2 in Algorithm 2 is to transform dynamic faults into some maximum number of static faults, i.e., into some maximum number of faults localized at some fixed set of processes. Consider rounds 4ρ − 3 and 4ρ − 2, with n = 4, α = f = 1. In round 4ρ − 3, predicate P α dyn ensures that, in total, at most n · α = 4 corrupted values are received. In other words, among the vectors f irst p 1 to f irst p 4 received (line 8), at most n · α = 4 elements can be corrupted (see Fig. 6 , where × represents possible corrupted values). In round 4ρ − 2, each process p i sends vector f irst p i to all processes. Consider the reception of these four vectors by some process p j . Since α = 1, one of these vectors can be received corrupted at p j . Figure 7 shows four examples, two starting from Fig. 6 left, two starting from Fig. 6 right.
To understand which value p adopts from q (lines 15 and 16) we need to look at column q in Fig. 7 . From line 16, p adopts a corrupted value from q only if column q contains at least n − f = 3 corrupted values. In the upper case, no column satisfies this condition, i.e., p adopts no corrupted value. In the lower case, columns 2 and 1 satisfy this condition, i.e., corrupted values can be adopted from p 2 
Nevertheless the same mechanisms can be used in both cases.
The theorem follows directly from Lemmas 3 and 4: the first lemma considers P β dyn and P α dyn , the second P Since in round 4ρ − 1 the elements of con f can only be set to ⊥, the same condition needs to holds also at the end of round 4ρ − 2. Because of line 15, this implies
Because
. The number of tuples (q, s) such that µ 4ρ−3 q
[s] = m s is thus at least (β + 1)(n − f − α). From this it follows that there is at least one process q 0 where the number of corrupted messages in the first round is
where the last inequation follows from n >
Lemma 4 If n
Proof Let ρ denote a macro-round, let Φ = {4ρ − 3, . . . , 4ρ} be the set of rounds of ρ, and let c 0 = ρmodn + 1 be the coordinator of ρ such that
Such a macro-round exists, because (i) P f,4( f +1) SK
holds and (ii) the coordinator is chosen using a rotating coordinator scheme (the coordinator of macro-round ρ is process ρmodn + 1). We show that with Algorithm 2 (i) CONS(ρ) and (ii) |SK(ρ)| ≥ n − f . ( 
Corollary 2 If n
By Corollary 2, preserving P α dyn leads to a quadratic dependency between n and α. Corollary 3 shows the surprising result that, allowing more than α corruptions in the simulated round, leads instead to a linear dependency between n and α. Note that the simulation mentioned in Corollary 3 is not useful if
Corollary 3 For any
η−1 it follows that ξα +1 ξα −α+1 < η. The corollary follows from Lemma 3 by setting β = ξα .
Generic predicate
In Sect. 7 we solve consensus using the following generic predicate, which combines P cons and P SK :
It defines a phase with k rounds, where the first round of some phase φ 0 is consistent and all rounds of phase φ 0 plus the preceding b rounds have safe kernel of size at least equal to n − f . Obviously, P cons⊕SK can be simulated from P SK and P stat using Algorithm 1, and from P SK and P dyn using Algorithm 2. In both cases, Algorithms 1 or 2 simulate the first round of a phase, and a trivial simulation (where messages are just delivered as received) are used for the other rounds. Ensuring that the coordinator is in the safe kernel requires f +1 phases. In case of Algorithm 1, the first macroround of a phase requires 3 rounds, and the others k − 1 only 1 round. Therefore f +1 phases correspond to (k +2)( f +1) rounds. This leads to:
Note that the additional term k + 1 for K stems from the fact that the rounds with a safe kernel are not necessarily aligned to the phases of P f,b,k cons⊕SK . In case of Algorithm 2, since the first macro-round requires 4 rounds, we have:
Here the additional alignment term in K is k + 2.
Solving consensus with eventual consistency
In this section we use the generic predicate P cons⊕SK to solve consensus. In all consensus algorithms below, the notation #(v) is used to denote the number of messages received with value v, i.e.,
The BOTR algorithm
We start with the simplest algorithm, namely the BOTR algorithm. The basic technique of this algorithm is that a value that is decided is locked in the sense that a sufficiently high quorum of processes retain this value as estimate. A similar algorithmic scheme can be found in algorithms for benign [9, 11, 16, 23] and arbitrary [4, 20] 9 We will show that BOTR is safe (in the sense that it fulfills integrity and agreement) for appropriate choices of T when P α dyn holds (or P α stat , since P α stat implies P α dyn ). The value of threshold T is chosen such that if some process decides v at line 14 of round r , then in any round r ≥ r , at all processes only v can be assigned to any vote, and hence only v can be decided. Termination is achieved in both cases if in addition the following predicate holds:
The P f B OT R predicate ensures the existence of phases φ 0 and φ 1 ≥ φ 0 such that: (i) in the first round of phase φ 0 processes receive the same set of at least n − f messages, and (ii) in the second round of phase φ 1 processes receive at least n − f uncorrupted messages.
Obviously, P f,0,2
Eventual consistency ensures the first part of the predicate, namely the existence of a consistent round 2φ 0 − 1 where in addition every process receives enough messages. This guarantees that at the end of round 2φ 0 − 1 all processes adopt the same value for vote p . The second part of the predicate forces every process to make a decision at the end of round 2φ 1 .
Correctness of the BOTR algorithm
First we introduce some piece of notation. For any variable x local to process p, we denote x (r ) p the value of x p at the end of round r . For any value v ∈ V and any process p, at any round r > 0, we define the sets R r p (v) and Q r p (v) as follows:
where s q denotes q's state at the beginning of round r . The set R r p (v) (resp. Q r p (v)) represents the set of processes from which p receives v (resp. which ought to send v to p) at round r . Since at each round of the consensus algorithm, every process sends the same message to all, the sets Q r p (v) do not depend on p, and so can be just denoted by Q r (v) without any ambiguity. We start our correctness proof with a general basic lemma:
Lemma 5 For any process p and any value v, at any round r , we have:
Proof Suppose that process p receives a message with value v at round r > 0 from process q. Then, either the code of q prescribes it to send v to p at round r , i.e., q belongs to Q r (v) and thus q is also in SHO( p, r ), or the message has been corrupted and q is in AHO( p, r ). It follows that
As an intermediate step to argue agreement, our next lemma introduces a condition on T that ensures no two processes can decide differently at the same round: 
v)| ≥ T and |R r q (v )| ≥ T . Then Lemma 5 ensures that |Q r (v)| ≥ T − |AHO( p, r )| and |Q r (v )| ≥ T − |AHO(q, r )|.
Since each process sends the same value to all at each round r , the sets Q r (v) The next lemma shows that once a sufficently high number of processes have the same vote, no other value will be adopted in later rounds by any process:
every process q that updates its variable vote q at round r sets it to v.
Proof Since vote is only updated in the first round of a phase, it sufficies to consider the case r = 2φ − 1. Since q updates vote q in round r , because of line 13, |HO(q, r )| ≥ T . Let Q r (v) denote the set of processes that, according to their sending functions, ought to send messages different from v at round r , and let R r q (v) denote the set of processes from which q receives values different from v at round r . Since each process sends a message to all at each round, Q r (v) = Π \Q r (v), and thus |Q r (v)| = n − |Q r (v)|. We now extend the statement of Lemma 7 to hold also for any phase φ > φ 0 : Proof Assume process p decides value v at round r 0 = 2φ 0 of phase φ 0 . We prove by induction on r that:
Similarly, we have R r q (v) = HO(q, r )\R r q (v), and since R r q (v) ⊆ HO(q, r ), it follows that |R r q (v)| ≤ T − R r q (v).
Lemma 8 If T > 2 3 (n + 2α),∀r ≥ r 0 , |{q ∈ Π : vote (r −1) q = v}| ≥ T − α.
Then Lemma 7 ensures this Lemma.
Basic case: r = r 0 . Since p decides v at round r 0 , then |R Proof Let φ 0 be the first phase at which some process p makes a decision, and let v be p's decision value. Assume that process q decides v at phase φ. By definition of φ 0 , we have φ ≥ φ 0 .
We proceed by contradiction, and assume that v = v . First, by induction on r , we show that: 
The B LV algorithm
The next algorithm we present is called B LV . It is based on the last voting mechanism [11] that was first introduced in the seminal Paxos algorithm by Lamport [18] for benign faults. This mechanism is also at the core of the PBFT algorithm by Castro and Liskov [10] , the Byzantine variant of the Paxos algorithm. B LV is designed to work both under P α stat and P α dyn . It requires n > 2(α + f ) and T > n 2 + α in the presence of dynamic value faults (P α dyn ), or n > 3 f , α = f , and T > n+ f 2 if value faults are only static (P α stat ). Termination is achieved with P α dyn or P α stat if in addition the following predicate holds:
The P f B LV predicate ensures the existence of a phase φ 0 such that: (i) in the first round of φ 0 processes receive the same set of messages, and (ii) in all three rounds of φ 0 processes receive at least n − f uncorrupted messages.
Obviously, P f,0,3 cons⊕SK implies P f B LV . Eventual consistency ensures that at the end of round 3φ 0 − 2, all processes select the same value. The condition that there exists a large enough safe kernel in phase φ 0 finally forces every process to make a decision at the end of round 3φ 0 . send vote p to all 27: T r p :
Algorithm 4 B LV algorithm
28:
Decidev
The code of B LV is given as Algorithm 4. It consists of a sequence of phases, where each phase φ has three rounds 3φ − 2, 3φ − 1 and 3φ. The last voting mechanism uses a timestamp variable ts in addition to to the variable vote. Whenever a process p updates vote p in round 3φ − 1, ts p is set to φ (line 21 and 22) . If enough processes update vote in round 3φ − 1, then a decision is possible in phase 3φ. This is the same mechanism as in Paxos. Note the condition at line 20. It ensures that in round 3φ − 1, all processes that update vote, update it to the same value. As in Paxos, this ensures that in round 3φ, processes attempt to decide on one single value, which is necessary for agreement.
In order to deal with value faults, B LV maintains also a histor y variable, which stores pairs (v, φ). Having (v, φ) ∈ histor y p means that p added (v, φ) to histor y p in phase φ (line 11). The histor y variable ensures that a corrupted message with invalid values for vote and ts p will not affect the safety properties of the algorithm. It is mainly used in round 3φ − 2, which has two roles, the first related to agreement and integrity, and the second related to termination:
Safety role:
(a) Agreement: If a process p has decided v in some phase φ 0 , then for any process q, only v can be assigned to select q at line 9 in phases φ > φ 0 . (b) Integrity: If all process have the same initial value v, then only v can be assigned to select p at line 9.
Termination role:
In a consistent round with safe kernel of size n − f , all processes must assign the same value to select at line 9.
Line 9 refers to the selection function FBLV T,α , which takes as input the messages received in round 3φ − 2. We explain now this function (Algorithm 5):
-Line 30 (together with line 31) ensures 1a. More precisely, it ensures selection of the most recent vote in the history of some process. This is basically the same mechanism as in Paxos, adapted to transmission value faults. Selecting the most recent vote among the set of majority processes can be expressed in Paxos as follows:
In Paxos, this selection rule ensures agreement since most recent vote is a single value. In BLV, a corrupted message can contain (vote, ts) with ts equal to the highest timestamp of a process, but with a different vote. Therefore, the above selection rule does not ensure 1a, since several values can satisfy the condition of lines 30 and 31. The solution consists in transforming condition ts ≥ ts into (v = v ∧ ts = ts ) ∨ ts > ts and using a higher threshold
With this, if a process has previously decidedv, then onlȳ v can be in con f irmed V . 10 -Line 31 prevents from returning a value v from a pair (v, ts) that is from a corrupted message: the pair must be in the history of at least one process. Therefore, a pair (v, ts) is considered only if it is part of the history in at least α + 1 messages received. Together with line 30, it also ensures 1b: when all processes have the same initial value, no other value is in the histor y p variable of processes.
We consider now lines 32 and 33 of Algorithm 5. As we just explained, if a process has previously decidedv, then onlyv can be in con f irmed V , that is, |con f irmed V | = 1. In this case, by line 33, the function FBLV T,α returnsv. If no correct process has decided, we can have |con f irmed V | > 1. In this case, if some round 3φ − 2 is a consistent round with safe kernel of size n − f , then all processes consider the same set con f irmed V , which ensures 2. Lines 34 and 35 are for the case where not all processes have the same initial value. Termination would be violated without these lines.
Correctness of the B L V algorithm
In this section we use the same definition of R(v) and Q (v) as in Sect. 7.1.1. 
10 Consider two phases φ 0 and φ 0 + 1, such that a process has decided v in phase φ 0 . We consider the more general case in the presence of dynamic faults, and we assume that n = 5, f = α = 1 and T = 4. This means that at least T − α = 3 processes have ts = φ 0 and vote =v. Consider in phase φ 0 + 1 that (v, ts) ∈ possibleV p at p with v =v. This means that p, in round 3(φ 0 +1) − 2, has received T = 4 messages with either (v, ts, −), or (−, ts , −) and ts < ts. Since n = 5 and T = 4, at least one of these messages is from a process c such that vote c =v and ts c = φ 0 . Since v =v, we must have φ 0 < ts. However, in phase φ 0 +1, no process p can have (v, ts) with ts > φ 0 in histor y p . Therefore, by line 31, we will not have v ∈ con f irmed V . Since by our assumption q added (v , −) to histor y q in phase φ 1 , this implies that FBLV T,α returns v at line 9 in phase φ 1 . Therefore, either (i) line 33 or (ii) line 35 of Algorithm 5 was executed by q in phase φ 1 .
Lemma 10 If T > α, then in any run of the HO machine (B LV
In case (ii), the condition of line 34 has to be true. This implies that |R We prove an intermediate result: In phases φ such that φ 0 ≤ φ < φ 1 , we have |{q ∈ Π : vote We now show that any process that locked value v in phase φ 0 (see Definition 1) and updates vote in phase φ such that φ 0 < φ < φ 1 , sets it to v. This ensures the claim. Assume by contradiction that one of these processes q sets vote q to v in round 3φ − 1. By line 20, |R
at least one process sent v at line 17. Therefore, by line 17 at least one process has (v , φ 0 +1) in histor y, a contradiction with the assumption that φ 1 is the first phase where a pair (v , −) is added to histor y at some process.
So we have also | ts≥φ 0 Q 3φ 1 −2 ((v, ts, −))| ≥ T −α. Since in each round, every process sends the same value to all, and φ 0 > 0, the sets X (v) = ts≥φ 0 Q 3φ 1 −2 ((v, ts, −) ) and Q 3φ 1 −2 ((−, 0, −) ) are disjoint. Hence,
Together with T > n 2 + α, we derive that
In case (i), the condition at line 32, has to be true, i.e., v need to be part of con f irmed V set at line 31. Value v can be part of the set con f irmed V only if (v , ts ) is part of the set possibleV at line 30. We show that if (v , ts ) is part of the set possibleV at line 30, v cannot be part of the set con f irmed V at line 31, which establishes the contradiction.
If the pair (v , ts ) is added to the set possibleV at line 30, then HO(q, Proof Let a phase φ 0 > 0 be the first phase at which some process p makes a decision, and let v be the p's decision value. Assume that process q decides v at phase φ . By definition of φ 0 , we have φ ≥ φ 0 .
We proceed by contradiction and assume that v = v . By Lemma 10, we derive that φ > φ 0 . Since q decides at round 3φ , by line 28 we have |R Proof By contradiction, assume that phase φ 0 > 0 is the first phase in which some process p decides v = v.
Since p decides at round 3φ 0 , by line 28 we have |R 
Therefore, in round 3φ 0 −2, for any two processes p and q, we have µ r p = µ r q , and |SHO( p, 3φ 0 −2)∩SHO(q, 3φ 0 −2)| ≥ n − f . Part A. We now prove that select 3φ 0 −2 p will be the same at all processes p, i.e., that FBLV T,α returns the same value at all processes, and all processes add the same pair to histor y in round 3φ 0 − 2. There are two cases to consider: (i) some process p ∈ SK(φ 0 ) locked a value in some phase smaller than φ 0 , or (ii) there is no such process in SK(φ 0 ).
Case (i): Let φ < φ 0 be the largest phase in which some process p locked some value v (line 21). By Lemma 9 and since Q > From (*) and (**), it follows that the condition of line 32 of Algorithm 5 is true at all processes in phase φ 0 . Moreover, since function FBLV T,α is deterministic and CONS(3φ 0 −2) holds, for any two processes p and q, we have select p = select q at line 9. Therefore p and q add the same pair to histor y at line 11.
Case (ii): By hypothesis, for all processes p ∈ SK(φ 0 ), we have ts p = 0. By (***) n − f ≥ T and therefore the condition at line 34 of Algorithm 5 is true at each process. Moreover, by CONS(3φ 0 −2) we have for any two processes p and q µ r p = µ r q . Therefore, the value returned at line 35 of Algorithm 5 is the same at all processes, and they will add the same pair to histor y at line 11 of Algorithm 4. Part B. From Part A, there exists a value v such that at all processes p we have (v, φ 0 ) ∈ histor y p at the beginning of round 3φ 0 − 1. Therefore all processes send v to all at line 26. By |SK(3φ 0 − 1)| ≥ n − f we have that all processes receive at least n − f messages equal to v, and since by (***) n − f ≥ T , they all set vote p to v (line 21) and send v to all at line 26. By |SK(3φ 0 )| ≥ n − f and the same reasoning we can show that all processes receive n − f messages equal to v in round 3φ 0 , and since by (***) n − f ≥ T , decide v at line 29 in phase φ 0 .
Combining Propositions 4, 5, and 6, we get the following theorem: Note that the B LV algorithm can also be used in the model considered in [4] , where all faults are transient. By Theorem 3, the B LV algorithm solves consensus in this model if n > 2α ( f = 0), in contrast to algorithm A T,E in [4] , which requires n > 4α. Algorithm U T,E,α in [4] requires n > 2α but, contrary to B LV , requires for safety that in every round every process receives a sufficient number of correct messages. This is not required by B LV , which is still correct even if processes do not receive any correct message in some rounds.
The B L K algorithm
The third algorithm we present is called B L K . It is based on locking/unlocking mechanism that was first introduced in the seminal consensus algorithm for benign and arbitrary faults given by Dwork, Lynch and Stockmayer [12] .
It requires n > 2(α + f ) and T > 
The P f B L K predicate ensures the existence of a phase φ 0 such that: (i) in the first round of φ 0 processes receive the same set of messages, (ii) in all three rounds of φ 0 processes receive correctly messages from at least n − f processes, and (iii) in the last round of phase φ 0 − 1 processes receive at least n − f uncorrupted messages.
Obviously, P
1,3
gen implies P f B L K . Eventual consistency ensures that at the end of round 3φ 0 − 2, all processes set select p to the same value. P f B L K also ensures a large enough safe kernel in the last round of the previous phase φ 0 −1. The role of this round is to ensure that all processes either lock the same value (those with the highest timestamp), or they do not lock any value. The condition that there exists a large enough safe kernel in phase φ 0 finally forces every process to make a decision at the end of round 3φ 0 .
The proof of correctness follows a similar pattern as for B LV and is not repeated here.
BLK versus BLV.
There are strong similarities between BLV and BLK: three rounds per phase, only round 3φ − 2 must eventually be a consistent round, the histor y variable. However, the mechanisms for agreement differ: BLV uses a last voting mechanism, while BLK employs a locking mechanism. The two mechanisms are used in round 3φ − 2, when assigning a value to select (line 9): -The last voting mechanism uses vote and ts (mechanism of PBFT and Paxos). -The locking mechanism uses only vote (mechanism introduced in [12] ).
This difference has consequences in the information sent in round 3φ−2: in BLV, vote p , ts p , histor y p is sent; in BLK, only vote p , init p is sent. The initial value is only needed when several correct processes do not have a locked value (vote = N one) as can be seen in Algorithm 7 (see line 3 and 4). To illustrate the difference between the two mechanisms, consider the case with dynamic value faults where n = 5, α = f = 1, T = 4 and some process p 1 has decided v 1 at the end of phase φ 1 . A possible configuration of processes p 1 to p 5 for the two algorithms at the end of phase φ 1 is the following:
where each tuple represents the states (vote, ts) and φ 2 < φ 1 . 11 The history at T − α = 3 processes contains the pair (v 1 , φ 1 ). In round 3(φ 1 + 1) − 2 of the BLV algorithm, let a process p 2 receive, from processes p 1 to p 5 (the message received from process p 5 is corrupted):
With the last voting mechanism, we have v 1 ∈ con f irmed V (there are 4 messages with vote = v 1 or ts < φ 1 and  (v 1 , φ 1 ) is in histor y of the message sent by three processes), and select p is set to v 1 . Assume that similarly, in round 3(φ 1 +1)−2 of the BLKalgorithm, process p 2 receives, from processes p 1 to p 5 (all messages are correctly received):
With the locking mechanism, validV in Algorithm 7 is empty (there are no four messages with vote = v 1 ), and null is returned. With the locking mechanism, processes p 1 , p 2 
This leads to have v 1 ∈ validV , and select p is set to v 1 . Observe that the unlocking mechanism requires histor y p (line 22). Therefore, we can also summarize the two mechanisms by saying that the last voting mechanism requires histor y p in phase 3φ − 2, while the locking mechanism requires histor y p in phase 3φ (for unlocking). Table 1 summarizes the resilience (right column) and the predicate for termination (middle column) of our three algorithms BOTR, B LV and B L K . We can observe that BOTR has the weakest predicate for termination, and the strongest condition for resilience. B LV and B L K have the same resilience, while B L K has a slightly stronger predicate for termination (it requires a safe kernel in one more round).
Summary of BOTR, B LV and B L K

Deriving the overall resilience of B LV
In this section we look at the overall resilience of the B LV consensus algorithm together with the P f B LV predicate simulation algorithm. A similar derivation can be done for the BOTR and B L K algorithms.
When solving consensus in the presence of (only) static value faults (P SK ∧ P Combining these conditions and setting β = kα, where k ∈ R, k ≥ 1, we can solve consensus with Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 2 under P f,6( f +1)+5 SK ∧ P α dyn if the following two conditions hold:
We first consider α > 1, then α = 1. Case α > 1: We can obtain different resilience bounds depending on the choice of k.
Choosing k = 1 leads to the quadratic dependency from Corollary 2, and is thus not what we want to achieve here.
For k ≥ 2, condition (3) implies condition (2) for any α > 1, because kα+1 kα−α+1 ≤ 2. Thus, when choosing k ≥ 2, the smallest n is obtained with k = 2:
In case 1 < k < 2, the optimal choice of k depends on α and f . As special case we get for k = 1.5 from condition (2), n > 3α+2 α+2 (α + f ), i.e., n > 3(α + f ) while from condition (3) we get n > 3α + 2 f Since both conditions should hold, it follows that n > 3(α + f ).
Case α = 1: For the special case α = 1 and f = 1, conditions (3) and (2) become n > 2(k − 1) + 4 and n > 2(k+1) k . We obtain the smallest value for n by choosing k = 1, which leads to n > 4.
Discussion:
The results show that k = 1 (i.e. β = α) leads to the smallest value of n only when α = 1. In cases where α > 1, a better choice is e.g. k = 1.5 (i.e. β = 1.5α). This is a non intuitive result.
Direct implementation of eventual consistency using authentication
In Sect. 6 we gave two simulations of P cons from P SK . In this section we show that in some systems we can get P cons with sufficiently high coverage without such a simulation, but simply using authentication. Authentication has been introduced very early in distributed computing research to solve consensus. Nevertheless, people were always struggling to give a rigorous formal definition of authentication. The first observation is that in a transmission fault model, the introduction of authentication makes the model in fact benign: if every process signs its messages and upon reception only correctly signed messages are processed, no corruptions can occur. This implies that with authentication (whatever it means) transmission faults are not able to capture Byzantine process faults. However, even if we consider process faults, it is hard to formalize authentication in a precise manner. A possible approach to this open question is, instead of trying define authentication, state what can be achieved with authentication. As we will show, (eventual) consistency is what we naturally get from authentication assuming (eventual) synchrony.
For the clarity of the presentation, we explain how eventual consistency can be achieved using authentication in two steps. In Sect. 9.1, we show how to obtain P I C from synchrony and a correct leader using authentication. In Sect. 9.2, we slightly modify the algorithm of Sect. 9.1 to obtain P cons from eventual synchrony and eventual correct leader.
9.1 Ensuring P I C from synchrony and correct leader using authentication Consistency, namely P f I C (Sect. 5), can be achieved with high probability using cryptographic signatures in a synchronous system with f Byzantine processes (note that we are then no more in the scope of the transmission fault model; for a discussion for the relation between these two models see Sect. 10). To that end, in every round that should be consistent, every process signs its messages before sending it to the (correct) leader. The leader collects all the messages it receives and forwards them to all processes. The processes deliver all correctly signed messages that are received from the leader as the messages of this round. Technically this procedure requires two "subrounds" that can be obtained in a similar way as the normal round structure. However, the algorithm is not a simulation as in the previous section, since the correctness is conditional.
Assuming the (i) signatures cannot be forged, (ii) the system is synchronous and (iii) the leader is correct, it is easy to see that (a) all processes have the same reception vector, and (b) all processes receive at least n − f messages. Therefore, P f I C holds.
9.2 Ensuring P cons from eventual synchrony and eventual correct leader using authentication
The above leader-based procedure can be used, with a small modification, to ensure P cons from eventual synchrony. It is sufficient to replace the fixed correct leader with a rotating leader. This ensures an eventual correct leader when synchrony holds. The result follows directly.
Communication predicates and corresponding systems
In the HO model, there are no faulty processes and no state corruption. Nevertheless, for predicates that characterize permanent faults, the model can be used to reason about classical Byzantine faults. This implies that the algorithms in this paper can be used also to solve consensus in the classical Byzantine fault model. We develop this observation first for Further, these interpretations show that the consensus algorithms BOTR, B LV and B L K presented in this paper can be used in classical system models. This allows us to compare BOTR, B LV and B L K with existing consensus algorithms, specifically consensus algorithms that tolerate arbitrary faults (process and/or link faults). The comparison appears in Table 2 . For BOTR, B LV and B L K , we assume the interpretation (*) in the preceding paragraph.
Conclusion
The transmission fault model allows us to reason about permanent and transient value faults in a uniform way, which makes the model very attractive. However, all existing solutions to consensus in this model are either in the synchronous system, or require strong conditions for termination that exclude the case where all messages of a process can be corrupted. The paper has shown that this limitation can be overcome thanks to the eventual consistency predicate that states the existence of a round where all processes receive the same set of messages. Two simulations of eventual consistency have been given, both from a predicate that corresponds to a partially synchronous system parameterized with α (in every round each process can receive up to α corrupted messages) and f (at most f processes are corrupted). The first simulation, which refers only to the parameter f , is for static faults. The second simulation, which refers to the parameters f and α, includes static and dynamic faults, and is compatible with permanent and transient faults. The paper has pointed out two options for this second simulation: preserving or not the number of corrupted messages in each round. The first option requires n > (α + 1)(α + f ). The second option requires n > η(α + f ). Combining the B LV consensus algorithm with this second simulation leads to n > 3(α + f ) for α > 1 and n > 4 for α = 1.
